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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court properly granted defendants summary 
judgment when plaintiff did not present a scintilla of evidence that defendants knew or 
should have known that their cat possessed vicious tendencies? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because all issues in this appeal involve questions of law, this Court 
reviews the trial court's conclusions for correctness. Field v. Boyer Co.. L.C.. 952 P.2d 
1078, 1079 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Shurtz v. BMW 
of North America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
Salt Lake County Third Judicial District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
entered judgment for defendants on their Motion for Summary Judgment on April 2, 
2001. (R. at 529-531). Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal from this judgment. (R. 
at 533). 
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III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (1971) Liability of owners - Scienter -
Dogs used in law enforcement. 
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in 
damages for injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be 
necessary in any action brought therefor to allege or prove 
that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or 
that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or 
mischievous; but neither the state nor any county, city or 
town in the state nor any peace officer employed by any of 
them shall be liable in damages for injury committed by a dog 
when: (1) The dog has been trained to assist in law 
enforcement, and (2) the injury occurs while the dog is 
reasonably and carefully being used in the apprehension, 
arrest, or location of a suspected offender or in maintaining or 
controlling the public order. 
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (1976). Liability for Harm 
Done by Domestic Animals That Are Not Abnormally Dangerous. 
Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a 
domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to 
know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for 
harm done by the animal if, but only if, 
(a) he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm, or 
(b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a cat bite case in which the plaintiff argued below that the owner of 
a house cat should be liable for the cat's first bite, even though the cat showed no 
propensity for viciousness and the harm to plaintiff was not foreseeable. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 15, 1996, plaintiff Judith Jackson observed a yellow tabby 
house cat sitting outside her home, at the top of the stairs leading to the second-story deck 
just off of her living room. (R. at 1, 142). 
2. Plaintiff owned four cats and would occasionally see cats in her yard. 
(R. at 347, 6:6; at 356, 41:10-18; at 357 44:4-10). 
3. Plaintiff mistook this cat for her own cat and opened the sliding glass 
door, calling the cat to come to her. (R. at 143). 
4. As the cat came toward her, she recognized that it was not her cat but 
proceeded to pet it anyway. (R. at 350, 16:17-25). 
5. She petted the cat on its head and ears, and it appeared friendly and 
purred. (R. at 350, 17:1-9). 
6. Then, for no apparent reason, the cat bit her right hand.1 (R. at 350, 
17:10-12). 
1
 Although defendants affirmatively denied it was their cat that bit plaintiff, they 
assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion that it was. (R. at 6-7, 130). 
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7. The cat left the second-story deck of plaintiff s home, and plaintiff 
does not know where it went after that. (R. at 142). 
8. Defendants Robert and Kris Mateus have had their cat since it was a 
kitten and, until the incident alleged by plaintiff, their cat had never exhibited any vicious 
tendencies and had never bitten or acted aggressively toward anyone. (R. at 145-46). 
9. For ten years, defendants' cat had exhibited a good disposition and 
provided them with comfort and companionship. (R. at 145-46). 
10. Both plaintiff and defendants are unaware of any time that the 
defendants' cat bit anyone before the incident alleged by plaintiff in her complaint. (R. at 
142, 145-46). 
11. Surprisingly, plaintiff sustained a serious injury from this cat bite 
with commensurate medical expenses. (R. at 2). 
12. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants alleging they were 
negligent in failing to restrain and control their cat; plaintiff did not allege defendants 
were strictly liable. (R. at 1-2). 
13. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that, 
since this cat bite was unforeseeable, they did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff (R. at 
128); Judge Tyrone E. Medley granted this motion. (R. at 529-531). 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a matter of law, the defendants did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff 
since her cat bite was not foreseeable. Defendants have had their cat since it was a kitten, 
and it has always had a good disposition and never displayed any tendency toward 
violence until the time alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff could not produce any evidence to 
demonstrate that defendants knew or should have known their cat might bite or act 
aggressively toward anyone. 
This Court, en banc, recently decided Pullan v. Steinmetz and Dimple Dell 
Ranchettes Owners Assoc, wherein it would not extend Utah's strict liability dog bite 
statute to horse owners and it declined to adopt the more inclusive definition of 
negligence contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518. 
Looking at the reasons our dog bite statute was enacted, Pullan noted that 
dogs are considered predatory animals, capable of harming poultry, sheep, and goats. 
Unlike dogs, cats typically only pose a threat to other cats, small birds, and rodents. 
Because of their mild temperament, we do not have leash laws for cats. No state in the 
country has a cat bite statute, and no court imposes strict liability on a cat owner for its 
first unsuspected bite. 
Pullan declined to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 and noted 
that even under its relaxed standard plaintiff there could not establish negligence against 
the defendants because there was no evidence that the harm to her was foreseeable. This 
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is the case here. Without knowledge of their cat's vicious propensities, defendants were 
not negligent in failing to restrain or confine their cat. Defendants' cat was properly 
roaming about the neighborhood since it had never displayed dangerous tendencies. 
Salt Lake County Ordinances provide that an owner of a vicious animal 
who does not keep the animal muzzled or restrained is a hazard to public safety. Plaintiff 
construes these ordinances to mean that an owner is liable for its animal's bite even if the 
owner did not know of its vicious propensities. This narrow interpretation would not be 
in harmony with Utah's animal statutes, would be against public policy, and would render 
the ordinances unconstitutional since it would create an unreasonable, arbitrary standard 
on unwitting animal owners. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT ESTABLISH DEFENDANTS 
OWED A DUTY TO HER, SHE COULD NOT PROVE 
A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE. 
The plaintiffs only cause of action in this matter is for negligence. "'One 
essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff 
by [the] defendant. Absent a showing of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover."1 Slisze v. 
Stanlev-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999). A duty has been described as "a 
question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular 
plaintiff." Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted). 
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The question of whether a duty exists is ordinarily a question of law, and as such is 
properly resolved by the trial court rather than by a jury. See AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. 
Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
The relevant factors in determining whether a duty exists in a negligence 
action include the following: the foreseeability of harm to others resulting from the 
actor's actions; the likelihood of injury; the magnitude of the burden of guarding against 
injury; the consequences of placing that burden on defendant; whether one's voluntary 
conduct increases the risk of harm; and whether general policy considerations exist. See 
id at321. 
A. It Was Not Foreseeable That the Defendants5 Cat Would Bite Anyone, 
"The existence of a duty of reasonable care depends in part on the extent to 
which a reasonable person can foresee that his acts may create a significant likelihood of 
causing harm to others." AMS Salt Industries, 942 P.2d at 319 (citing Cruz v. 
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, 909 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Utah 1996)). Defendants had 
absolutely no knowledge that their cat often years would have any propensity to cause 
harm to anyone. Their cat had never bitten anyone in the past or exhibited any violent 
tendency which would have forewarned them that their cat might bite someone. Since 
they had no knowledge of any inclination of their cat to bite, they cannot be held liable 
for the plaintiffs alleged injuries. Not until the moment of that bite could defendants 
have foreseen that their cat, if it was their cat, would cause harm to anyone. Defendants 
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had no notice that they should screen their cat from the public generally or from the 
plaintiff specifically-if putting such controls on a cat's outdoor activities were even 
possible.2 
Defendants did nothing any differently than any other cat owner in 
America. They permitted their cat to go outside and behave as a cat, confident it would 
engage in typical cat-like behavior. As a nearly universal proposition, cat owners do not 
keep their cats locked indoors or screened from the public or on a leash. Plaintiff cannot 
show any duty on the part of the defendants that is different from any other cat owner's 
duty. Nor can she demonstrate how defendants failed to exercise reasonable care. To 
survive summary judgment plaintiff had to produce at least a scintilla of evidence to 
imply that the defendants had any idea their cat might cause harm to someone. Without 
any evidence of knowledge that could be imputed to the defendants, plaintiff cannot 
prove that a duty arose which would make the defendants legally liable for their cat's 
bite. 
1. Other Relevant Factors Demonstrate No Duty Was Owed to 
Plaintiff. 
In addition to foreseeability, several other factors are relevant in 
determining whether a duty exists in a negligence action. Other factors include: 1) the 
2
 Plaintiff states that the defendants' cat also "attacked" her husband. (See 
Appellant's Brief at 5-6, 10). However, as is clear from his deposition testimony, this 
alleged attack happened after the bite incident involving plaintiff. (R. at 406, 14:11-13). 
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likelihood of injury, 2) the magnitude or the burden of guarding against it, 3) the 
consequences of placing that burden on a defendant, 4) whether voluntary conduct 
increases the risk of harm, and 5) whether any general policy considerations exist. AMS 
Salt Industries, 942 P.2d at 320. These factors also illustrate that the defendants did not 
owe plaintiff a duty of care. 
The defendants cannot have divined that their cat possessed tendencies that 
were likely to cause injury to anyone. Their cat was a typical tabby cat, not one of a 
dangerous breed. To ask our cat-friendly society to guard against every potential cat bite 
would be a demand of enormous proportions that would place too great a burden on the 
cat owner population. To require that the public keep their cats confined and out of their 
natural habitat calls for more than our society is prepared to do to prevent cat bites and it 
expects too much from the unsuspecting defendants here. By voluntarily outstretching 
her arm to any animal, including a cat, plaintiff increases the risk of harm to her, even 
though she had no reason to expect this cat would bite her. Nonetheless, one has to 
assume some risk by intentionally placing a hand by an animal's mouth. Finally, general 
public policy dictates that cats be left to themselves and be permitted to roam at large for 
the benefit of society. No factors that courts consider when imposing a duty can be 
construed to create a duty for the defendants here. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS RECENTLY REFUSED TO EXTEND 
THE STRICT LIABILITY DOG BITE STATUTE TO OTHER ANIMALS 
OR TO ADOPT THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 
IN RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 518. 
In a recent case before this Court, Pullan v. Steinmetz and Dimple Dell 
Ranchettes Owners Assoc, 2000 UT 103, 16 P.3d 1245, a 12-year-old girl was bitten by 
a horse while she was feeding it in its stable, and her hand was disfigured. She sued the 
horse owner and keeper, alleging theories of strict liability, negligence, and attractive 
nuisance; the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all theories. 
Affirming this judgment, the Utah Supreme Court, en banc, refused to extend our strict 
liability dog bite statute to horse owners and declined to adopt the more inclusive 
definition of negligence contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (1976). 
A. Our "Dog Bite Statute51 Is Limited to Dogs, 
The plaintiff in Pullan argued that when horses are kept as hobbies and pets 
and are not used as necessities, their owners should be strictly liable for injuries caused 
by them. This court declined plaintiffs invitation to extend the strict liability statute for 
dog owners3 to horse owners. See Pullan, 16 P.3d at 1247. This court noted that the 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (1971) reads in pertinent part: 
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in 
damages for injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be 
necessary in any action brought therefor to allege or prove 
that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or 
that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or 
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legislature imposed strict liability on dog owners for reasons that would not support 
extending it to horse owners, even when horses are kept for recreational purposes. For 
example, dogs are considered predatory animals, capable of harming poultry, sheep, and 
goats, and our laws permit a dog to be shot if it attacks animals of commercial value.4 
The court also found support in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977), which does 
not attach strict liability on a pet owner unless the owner has reason to know the animal 
has "dangerous propensities abnormal to its class." Id. 
Dogs that roam without a leash pose a greater threat to the public than a cat 
does. Typical cats that roam neighborhoods pose a threat only to other cats, small birds, 
and rodents; they do not pose a threat to animals of commercial value, to the vast 
majority of dogs, or to humans. Because of cats5 normally mild temperament, our 
legislature has not created leash laws for cats. In addition, dogs can be confined by 
devises such as fences; such reasonable confinement techniques are not possible with 
cats. 
mischievous. . . . 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-3 (2000) reads: 
Any person may injure or kill a dog while it is attacking, 
chasing, or worrying any domestic animal having a 
commercial value, any assistance animal as defined in Section 
78-20-101, or any species of hoofed protected wildlife, while 
attacking domestic fowls, or while the dog is being pursued 
hereafter. 
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1. Dog Bite Statutes Are the Trend, and Plaintiff Cannot Point 
to One Cat Bite Statute from Any Jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff relies on Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1, commonly known as the "dog 
bite statute," and other states dog bite statutes to demonstrate that the one free bite rule is 
falling into disfavor in our country. (See Appellant's Brief at 8, 25-29). A diligent 
search of other courts across the country shows that no state imposes liability on a cat 
owner for his or her cat's first bite unless the owner had prior knowledge of the cat's 
vicious propensity. All the cases cited by the plaintiff that impose liability on the owner 
involve dog bites. Obviously, no court in America is willing to impose strict liability on a 
cat owner for a cat's first unsuspected bite. Because of a cat's usually docile nature, it 
does not make sense to keep it away from the public unless it displays a violent 
disposition. Significantly, Utah courts have applied the dog bite statute only to dogs, not 
to other animals, and have never imposed strict liability on a cat owner. See S.H. By and 
Through Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996); Sharp v. Williams. 915 P.2d 
495 (Utah 1996); Neztsosie v. Mever, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994). 
Cats are different from dogs. Unlike some dogs, cats are not aggressive by 
nature and cat owners cannot be expected to anticipate that their cats might act in a 
vicious manner. This is demonstrated by virtue of the fact that numerous states have 
enacted statutes specifically addressing dog bites, but not cat bites. The enactment of our 
dog bite statute does not show any legislative intent to apply the same standard to 
incidents involving any other animal. "[Mjost statutes eliminating the necessity of 
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proving scienter specifically apply to dogs, and at least one court has rejected the view 
that such a statute extends by implication to owners or keepers of cats...." Cheryl M. 
Bailey, Liability for Injuries Caused by Cat 68 ALR4th 823, 830 (1989). 
American courts have consistently adhered to the common law position that 
cats are "domesticated animalfs] which are not naturally dangerous," and cat owners do 
not owe a duty to others when their cats bite someone, unless they had notice of the 
animal's tendency to be vicious: 
Tradition, based on the experience that cats are so unlikely to 
do harm if left to themselves and so incapable of constant 
control if they are to serve as mousers, has permitted cats to 
run at large, while recognizing at the same time that there are 
circumstances under which it is negligent to allow them to do 
so. 
Id. at 829. This position is based on the understanding that cats are not inherently 
dangerous as are other animals, like certain dogs. 
Cat owners are entitled to summary judgment where they "put into the 
record positive evidence that they had no knowledge of the animal ever biting anyone 
before [and] the plaintiff [has] no evidence to the contrary." Fellers v. Carson. 356 
S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga. App. 1987) (cat owner entitled to summary judgment where 
neighbor was bitten by cat as she attempted to remove cat from her own yard). Even if a 
cat has bitten someone before, it does not necessarily follow that the cat is a vicious 
animal. In Lee v. Weaver, 237 N.W.2d 149, 150-51 (Neb. 1976), a domestic worker 
brought an action against the owner of a cat to recover for injuries sustained from a cat 
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bite. That court held (1) knowledge of a cat's vicious or dangerous propensities is 
indispensable to liability on the part of the owner, and (2) evidence of a bite by a house 
cat on some prior occasion is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain a finding that the cat is 
vicious or dangerous, and factors such as provocation, or that the cat was engaged in play 
when the prior bite occurred, ought to be considered. Id 
In a case with similar facts to this one, Van Houten v. Pritchard. 870 
S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ark. 1994), plaintiff was bit by a cat and underwent four surgeries and 
incurred $39,000 in medical bills, but he failed to prove the cat had a propensity toward 
violence or that defendants violated any leash law. The court held that "the owner of a 
domestic cat may permit his cat to run at large unless it has shown a propensity toward 
violence, or unless an ordinance or statute provides otherwise". See also, Harris v. 
O'Higgins, 2000 WL 306717, 3 (Mass. App. Div. 2000) (cat owner not liable to plaintiff 
bitten in an unprovoked attack on her back porch since she did not advance a scintilla of 
evidence that cat had vicious propensities of which defendants should have been aware); 
Dubroca and Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So.2d 120, 123 (La. App. 1957) (cat owner not 
liable for cat bite since cat never exhibited vicious traits before); Boyer v. Seal 534 So.2d 
30 (La. App. 1988), cert, granted, 538 So.2d 600, affirmed 553 So.2d 827 (cat owner not 
liable to injured plaintiff who fell after cat brushed up against her because plaintiff could 
not show cat was aggressive or inherently dangerous). 
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Here, there is no evidence that the defendants' house cat had any dangerous 
or vicious propensities or that it had bitten anyone before. Plaintiff does not allege a 
previous bite had occurred, and defendants affirmatively state that their cat has never 
bitten anyone before plaintiff received her bite. The defendants should not be held liable 
for the unanticipated behavior of their cat—even if it can be shown that it was actually 
their cat that did the biting, which they strongly dispute-because they could not have 
guessed that it would bite anyone in the first place. 
B. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 Is Not the Law in Utah, but Even 
Under That Standard Defendants Are Not Negligent 
Analyzing plaintiffs negligence theory in Pullan, the court first noted that 
the test in Utah for imposing liability on a domestic animal owner was last expressed 
sometime ago. In Loonev v. Bingham Dairy. 70 Utah 398, 260 P. 855, 857 (1927), the 
court held that "when a domestic animal is rightly at the place where the injury occurs, 
the owner is not liable unless the viciousness of the animal and knowledge of such fact on 
the part of the owner are shown." Pullan. 16 P.3d at 1247 (citing Loonev. 260 P2d at 
857). The plaintiff in Pullan urged the court to relax the Loonev test and adopt the 
negligence standard contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, which sets out 
when an owner of a domestic animal that is not known to be abnormally dangerous can 
be held liable: 
§ 518. Liability for Harm Done by Domestic Animals That 
Are Not Abnormally Dangerous 
15 
Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a 
domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to 
know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for 
harm done by the animal if, but only if, 
(b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (emphasis added).5 
The only way that plaintiff can point to any liability on the part of the 
defendants is if she can show that they somehow were negligent in failing to prevent the 
harm allegedly suffered by her. The plaintiff in PuUan pointed to comment h of § 518 for 
the proposition that "even normally gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under 
particular circumstances." 16 P.3d at 1248. The plaintiff here points to the same 
proposition and alleges that defendants "should have been aware that their cat would 
come into contact with other persons" and that such "contact could result in an attack and 
harm to innocent persons." (See Appellant's Brief at 15). However, it would be highly 
speculative for a cat owner to believe that, since his or her cat could get in close 
proximity to a human being, the cat would therefore bite or harm that person. Although a 
cat's coming into contact with a human is likely, it is highly improbable that a cat would 
harm someone. 
In the case at bar, the cat was in a typical place where no extenuating 
circumstances would have suggested that it would behave aggressively. Plaintiff invited 
5
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, with comments, is attached hereto as 
Addendum E. 
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the cat to come toward her so she could pet it. She did nothing to provoke or worry the 
cat, and its bite was as much a surprise to her as it was to defendants. Defendants had no 
reason to know they should keep it at home or keep it off plaintiff s property. This was a 
fluke incident that defendants could not have anticipated. 
The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 further illustrate that 
defendants are not negligent under that standard. Since plaintiff can bring forth no 
evidence to show that defendants should have taken precautions to confine or leash then-
cat or otherwise keep it under constant control (as indicated by comment e); since the 
amount of care that the defendants exercised was commensurate with that of their breed 
of cat (as suggested by comment f); since defendants possessed knowledge of their cat's 
normal characteristics (as required by comment g); and since their animal was not 
dangerous under the particular circumstances here of roaming at large (comment h); they 
cannot be held to have been negligent in failing to prevent any harm to anyone. 
Therefore, plaintiffs reliance on the Restatement still cannot impose liability on 
defendants. 
Pullan rejected adopting as the law of Utah the standards of liability 
contained in § 518 saying that, even under the Restatement standard, the plaintiff could 
not establish a prima facie case of negligence against the defendants because there was 
no evidence that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable. See Pullan, 16 P. 3d at 1247 
(emphasis added). This Court pointed out that defendants had no prior knowledge that a 
17 
potential hazard existed to children who entered the stables and fed the horses without 
permission. "Without knowing that or having reason to know that, a jury could not find 
defendants negligent." Id. 
What mattered in Pullan is what matters in this case: whether a defendant 
animal owner can foresee that the animal will cause harm to others. Without knowledge 
of his or her animal's potential for viciousness, an owner cannot be charged with 
negligence for allowing it to behave as other animals similarly situated. Just as in Pullan, 
the defendants here had no knowledge that their housecat had any vicious propensity. 
Without this knowledge, the law in Utah is that a cat owner cannot be held liable for his 
or her cat's first unforeseeable bite. Without the ability to foresee and prevent harm, there 
is no duty on a cat owner to keep a house cat confined. Since plaintiff could not establish 
a, prima facie case of negligence against defendants, summary judgment was appropriate. 
1. Defendants1 Cat Was Rightly at the Place Where the Injury Occurred. 
In the Pullan and Looney horse bite cases, the courts noted that, when an 
animal is "rightly at the place where the injury occurs," the owner is not liable for any 
harm unless the owner had knowledge of the animal's propensity for viciousness. Pullan, 
16 P.3d at 1248 (citing Looney, 260 P. at 857). Plaintiff alleges that defendants' cat was 
not rightly on defendants' property when the injury occurred and that, therefore, 
defendants need not have had any knowledge of their cat's propensity for viciousness for 
liability to attach to them for the attack. (See Appellant's Brief, at 16). 
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Although defendants' cat may not have been specifically invited to enter the 
outside boundaries of plaintiff s property, it was never prevented from doing so and was 
free to roam about because it had no known dangerous tendencies. Once the cat was 
inside her property line and on her deck, plaintiff actually summoned the cat to pet it, 
indicating that she had no objection to its presence. Plaintiff does not allege that she did 
not allow cats (including defendants' cat) on her property. In fact, since plaintiff herself 
owns cats, she should have expected other cats might be attracted to her home. Her own 
cat may have been outside roaming, or had been on occasion, because she initially 
thought this was her own cat. Once a cat is roaming outside, its owner has about as much 
control over it as does any other person. Cats are by their nature very independent, and 
our society has come to allow them easy access to almost any outdoor venue. 
To say that the cat was an "unwelcome trespasser" (see Appellant's Brief at 
17) is inaccurate since it did not become unwelcome until after it bit plaintiffs hand. 
This cat had never displayed any fierce, vicious, or dangerous behavior that would have 
suggested to defendants that they needed to restrain it. Plaintiff cannot point to one 
ordinance or statute that prohibits a cat with unknown vicious tendencies from freely 
roaming. 
For support of the proposition that defendants' cat was trespassing, plaintiff 
cites Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-64, which deals with livestock that run at large; and Utah 
Code Ann. § 4-25-4 deals with agricultural estrays, such as sheep, cattle, horses, mules, 
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and swine (as defined in U.C.A. § 4-25-1). These statutes are inapposite since they were 
obviously enacted to protect from harm caused by farm animals that do not freely roam 
our communities. Agricultural animals are difficult to manage because of their size and 
dispositions. Cats do not pose these risks. 
POINT III 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINANCES 
DO NOT APPLY TO DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff states that defendants violated Salt Lake County Ordinances and 
that this is "evidence of negligence" on the part of defendants. Salt Lake County 
Ordinance § 8.24.010, which imposes liability in some circumstances on an animal owner 
for an animal bite, reads in pertinent part: 
A. Any owner or person having charge, care, custody or 
control of an animal or animals causing a nuisance, as 
defined below, shall be in violation of this title and 
subject to the penalties provided in this title. 
B. The following shall be deemed a nuisance: 
1. Any animal which: 
b. Is a vicious animal as defined in this title 
and kept contrary to Section 8.24.030 
below. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A "vicious animal" is defined as: 
A. Any animal which, in a vicious and terrorizing manner 
approaches any person in apparent attitude of attack 
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upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or 
places; 
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency or 
disposition to attack or to cause injury or otherwise 
endanger the safety of human beings or animals; or 
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or 
otherwise attacks a human being or domestic animal on 
public or private property. 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.04.210 (emphasis added). 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030 addresses the proper method of 
keeping and restraining a vicious animal from the public. It reads: 
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or 
vicious animal to permit such animal to go or be off the 
premises of the owner unless such animal is under restraint 
and properly muzzled so as to prevent it from injuring any 
person or property. Every animal so vicious and dangerous 
that it cannot be controlled by reasonable restraints, and every 
dangerous and vicious animal not effectively controlled by its 
owner or person having charge, care or control of such 
animal so that it shall not injure any person or property, is a 
hazard to public safety, and the director of animal services 
shall seek a court order pursuant to Section 8.40.010 for 
destruction of or muzzling of the animal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under these ordinances, an animal and its owner are a hazard to the public 
if the animal causes a nuisance by virtue of being 1) vicious and 2) not properly 
restrained. Plaintiff advocates construing these ordinances to mean that an owner is 
liable when its animal attacks a person, ''even where an owner may not know of the 
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animal's vicious propensities." (See Appellant's Brief at 22.) However, this narrow 
interpretation would seem to have the effect of imposing strict liability on owners of any 
house pet at the moment of its first bite. 
Our counties have general powers to promote the safety and welfare of their 
inhabitants.6 When an ordinance and a statute could be read to be at odds with each 
other, the general rule of judicial interpretation is: 
"Ordinances are to be construed in light of, and in harmony 
with, applicable provisions of charter, state law, constitution, 
and public policy. . . .an ordinance enacted pursuant to a 
statute should be construed by reading it with the statute, and 
if the language of both is in substance alike the presumption is 
indulged that the ordinance was designed to follow the 
statute." 
Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). When 
construing an ordinance, "the primary responsibility of this Court is to give effect to the 
Legislature's underlying intent." Id. 
Plaintiffs interpretation of liability on any unwitting animal owner would 
be in contravention of what the county council intended and against public policy because 
it would result in an unreasonable standard that would necessitate the confinement of all 
animals, regardless of their harmless nature. It would be in disharmony with and 
improperly stretch our dog bite statute to other animals and render the ordinances 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-302( 1 )(b) reads: "A county may.. .provide services, exercise 
powers, and perform functions that are reasonable related to the safety, health, morals, and 
welfare of their inhabitants, except as limited or prohibited by statute." 
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unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary since unsuspecting animal owners would be liable 
for their animal's first bite. Any owner, regardless of the type of pet, would be in 
violation of the ordinances whether their pet had any vicious tendencies whatsoever, and 
the only way to enforce the ordinances would be after the fact. 
Ordinances must define an offense "with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and any manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983). The ordinances here should be read in harmony with our statutes that 
require a vicious animal to be restrained from the public when its vicious propensities are 
known, or should be known, to the owner.7 
Plaintiff implies defendants breached their duty to the public by not having 
their house cat properly muzzled, restrained, or confined. Most cat owners, like 
defendants, do not do this to their cats. Until their cat's first bite, defendants had no way 
of knowing they should treat their cat any differently than any other cat. Interpreted as 
plaintiff suggests, this would mean that every time a cat, rabbit, gerbil, hamster, bird, 
turtle, or guinea pig bites someone, its owner would be liable. This stretches the 
ordinances beyond what they were intended to do, which is sequester known vicious 
animals from the public. 
7
 The unconstitutionality of these ordinances was not considered by the court below. 
(R. at 531). 
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Utah does not have leash laws for cats and permits them to roam freely. No 
local ordinance or state statute restricts a house cat's movement until it is known to be a 
"vicious" animal. It would be against public policy to require all Utah cats to be leashed 
or caged. These animals not only assist in the control of rodents, but more importantly 
they are enjoyed by many Utahns because of their pleasant disposition and relatively low 
maintenance. By their nature, cats are animals that freely roam our neighborhoods and 
should only be prevented from doing so if they have dangerous propensities. 
The defendants' cat was never known to bite or attack any person in any 
way. Nor has the animal ever acted in a threatening manner. Their cat has never been 
known to chase vehicles or attack other domestic animals. Until a cat exhibits aggressive 
behavior, it is simply not a vicious animal under Utah law, and the owners are not 
required to keep it restrained as such. The defendants have no obligation to restrain it 
any differently than do thousands of other cat owners who allow their cats to roam. Since 
they did not owe a duty to plaintiff, plaintiff could not meet an essential element of her 
negligence claim against the defendants. 
A cat owner who has no notice that his/her cat has any vicious propensities 
cannot be expected to keep the cat locked in-doors at all times. Most cat owners cannot 
anticipate that their cats will act viciously and therefore often allow their cats to enter and 
exit their home at will. Indeed, it is reasonable for a cat owner to expect that his or her 
cat will not act viciously. 
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A cat owner simply cannot be on notice that the cat is vicious until after it 
has bitten or attacked someone or otherwise demonstrated vicious propensities. 
Interpreting the statute otherwise would render every cat, and every other house pet for 
that matter, a "vicious" animal, thereby requiring that owners "lock up" non-vicious pets 
at all times. Surely the ordinances at issue were not intended to institute such cruel and 
paranoid measures. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Because experience has shown cats are so unlikely to do harm, courts 
across the country have consistently refused to hold cat owners liable when their cats bite 
people unless they had some prior notice of the cat's vicious tendencies. Neither the 
county nor the state has required house cats to be leashed. Defendants' cat has always 
had a good disposition and never displayed any tendency toward violence until the time 
alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff could not produce a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate that 
defendants knew or should have known their cat might bite or act aggressively toward 
anyone. 
This Court, en banc, in Pullan v. Steinmetz and Dimple Dell Ranchettes 
Owners Assoc, would not extend Utah's strict liability dog bite statute to horse owners 
and should similarly decline plaintiffs invitation to extend it to cat owners. We have 
leash laws for dogs, not for cats, because cats have mild temperaments and we permit 
them to roam freely. In Pullan, this Court also rejected adopting the more inclusive 
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definition of negligence contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 since the 
plaintiff there could not establish negligence against the defendants when no evidence 
that the harm to her was foreseeable. This is the case here. Without knowledge of then-
cat's vicious propensities, defendants were not negligent in failing to restrain or confine 
their cat. 
Salt Lake County Ordinances provide that an owner of a vicious animal 
who does not keep the animal muzzled or restrained is a hazard to public safety. These 
ordinances should be read in harmony with our state's animal statutes that require 
animals, like dogs, to be separated from the public when they have known vicious 
propensities. 
Utah should not render an owner of a house cat liable for his or her cat's 
first bite when the cat has shown no propensity for viciousness and the harm to someone 
is not foreseeable. Plaintiff did not present a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate that 
defendants knew or should have known that their cat possessed vicious tendencies. 
Without this showing, the trial court properly ruled as a matter of law that defendants did 
not owe her a duty of care and rightly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this /ff^Jay of December, 2001. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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IX. ADDENDUM E 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (1976). Liability for Harm Done by 
Domestic Animals That Are Not Abnormally Dangerous 
Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a 
domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to 
know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for 
harm done by the animal if, but only if, 
(a) he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm, or 
(b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm. 
Comment: 
a. Strict liability for the trespass of livestock is covered in ss 504 and 505. 
b. The term "domestic animal" is used in the sense defined in s 506. The liability of one 
who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he has reason to know possesses 
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class is determined by the rule stated in s 509. 
c. The phrase "have reason to know" here as elsewhere in the Restatement means that the 
person in question knows or from facts known to him should know. (See s 12). 
d. The rule stated in this Section determines the liability of one who possesses or harbors 
a domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally 
dangerous, for any type of harm done by it except during its intrusion upon the land of 
another. 
e. This Section is applicable to those domestic animals of a class that can be confined to 
the premises of their keepers or otherwise kept under constant control without seriously 
affecting their usefulness and which are not abnormally dangerous. Although the utility of 
these animals is sufficient to justify their being kept without risk of the strict liability 
stated in s 509, many of them are recognizably likely to do substantial harm while out of 
control and, therefore, their keepers are under a duty to exercise reasonable care to have 
them under a constant and effective control. Thus there is a likelihood that even a 
well-broken mare or gelding that had never shown a propensity to bite or kick may do so 
when running loose. This is sufficient to require its keeper to exercise reasonable care to 
keep it under constant control. 
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f. Amount of care required. The amount of care that the keeper of a domestic animal is 
required to exercise in its custody is commensurate with the character of the animal. The 
high temper normal to stud animals is so inseparable from their usefulness for breeding 
purposes that they are not kept at the risk of the liability stated in s 509. This quality, 
however, is enough to require greater precautions to confine the animals to the land on 
which they are kept and to keep them under effective control when taken off the 
premises. 
g. Knowledge of normal characteristics. In determining the care that the keeper of a not 
abnormally dangerous domestic animal is required to exercise to keep it under control, 
the characteristics that are normal to its class are decisive, and one who keeps the animal 
is required to know the characteristics. Thus the keeper of a bull or stallion is required to 
take greater precautions to confine it to the land on which it is kept and to keep it under 
effective control when it is taken from the land than would be required of the keeper of a 
cow or gelding. 
h. Animals dangerous under particular circumstances. One who keeps a domestic animal 
that possesses only those dangerous propensities that are normal to its class is required to 
know its normal habits and tendencies. He is therefore required to realize that even 
ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. Thus the keeper of even a gentle 
bull must take into account the tendencies of bulls as a class to attack moving objects and 
must exercise greater precautions to keep his bull under complete control if he drives it 
upon a public highway. So, too, the keeper of an ordinarily gentle bitch or cat is required 
to know that while caring for her puppies or kittens she is likely to attack other animals 
and human beings. 
i. When the liability stated in this Section is based upon the negligence of the keeper of 
the animal, the person injured is barred by his contributory fault under the same 
conditions as in all other cases of negligence. (See ss 463-499). 
j . Animals permitted to run at large. There are certain domestic animals so unlikely to do 
harm if left to themselves and so incapable of constant control if the purpose for which it 
is proper to keep them is to be satisfied, that they have traditionally been permitted to run 
at large. This class includes dogs, cats, bees, pigeons and similar birds and also poultry, 
in a locality in which by custom they are permitted to run at large, and therefore are not 
regarded as livestock for whose intrusion upon the land of another their possessor is 
strictly liable under the rule stated in s 504. It would be impossible to confine bees within 
the owner's premises without entirely destroying their usefulness as honey producing 
insects except at prohibitive expense. Although it is not impossible to confine dogs to the 
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premises of their keepers or to keep them under leash when taken into a public place, they 
have been traditionally regarded as unlikely to do substantial harm if allowed to run at 
large, so that their keepers are not required to keep them under constant control. The 
same is true of cats. However, although the possessor or harborer of a dog or cat is 
privileged to allow it to run at large and therefore is not required to exercise care to keep 
it under constant control, he is liable if he sees his dog or cat about to attack a human 
being or animal or do harm to crops or chattels and does not exercise reasonable care to 
prevent it from doing so. 
k. There may, however, be circumstances under which it will be negligent to permit an 
animal to run at large, even though it is of a kind that customarily is allowed to do so and 
under other circumstances there would be no negligence. Thus if a horse is turned loose 
in a field that abuts upon a public highway, and there is no fence to keep him off the 
highway, it may reasonably be anticipated that he will wander onto it, and that, 
particularly in the night time, his presence there may constitute an unreasonable danger to 
traffic. In these cases there may be liability for negligence upon the same basis as in other 
negligence cases. 
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